TLS 1.3 vs TLS 1.2: faster handshakes and fewer ways to get it wrong

By TechCompare · Updated · How we check

Enable TLS 1.3 and keep TLS 1.2 for older clients. TLS 1.3 connects in one round trip and only allows modern ciphers. TLS 1.2 is safe when it's limited to ECDHE key exchange and ciphers like AES-GCM.

TLS 1.2 came out in 2008 and TLS 1.3 in 2018, as RFC 8446. Both encrypt HTTPS, and both are safe when set up well. TLS 1.3 connects faster and is much harder to misconfigure, because it removed the old options behind most TLS attacks. Older clients still need TLS 1.2, so most sites run both.

Topic
TLS 1.3 vs TLS 1.2
TLS versions
Category
TLS and certificates
Versions, keys and certificate errors

How this is calculated

A full TLS 1.2 handshake takes two round trips before any page data can flow. TLS 1.3 takes one, because the browser sends its key share in its very first message. On a slow mobile link, that's a wait you skip on every new connection.

The bigger change is what TLS 1.3 took out. RSA key exchange is gone, so every full handshake uses a fresh key, and a stolen server key can't decrypt traffic someone recorded earlier. That's called forward secrecy. CBC mode ciphers, RC4, SHA-1 signatures, compression and renegotiation are gone too, and each one was behind a known attack on older versions. TLS 1.3 defines five cipher suites, and browsers use three: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256.

TLS 1.2 has hundreds of cipher suites, and the server's settings decide which one gets used. A safe setup picks ECDHE for the key exchange and AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 for encryption, like TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. Suites that start with TLS_RSA_ have no forward secrecy, and the ones with CBC in the name have a long record of attacks.

TLS 1.3 also adds 0-RTT, which lets a returning visitor send a request along with its first message. An attacker can replay that early request, so servers should only accept it for requests that change nothing, like a plain GET.

The SSL Checker tries each TLS version on its own. For TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 it shows the cipher suite the server picks, and for TLS 1.3 also the key exchange group.

Verdict

Allow TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, and nothing older. On TLS 1.2, limit the server to ECDHE suites with AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305, close to what Mozilla's intermediate server profile recommends. Then check the site and read the cipher the server picks for each version.

More SSL scenarios

Frequently asked questions

Is TLS 1.2 still safe?
Yes, when it's set up with forward secrecy and modern ciphers like AES-GCM. TLS 1.2 itself hasn't been broken. The risk sits in the old cipher suites it still allows, so the server's cipher list matters more than the version number.
Can I turn off TLS 1.2 and only use TLS 1.3?
You can, and some sites do. Every current browser supports TLS 1.3. Older Android phones, old Java and .NET programs, and some scanners, payment terminals and embedded devices don't, so look at who connects before you drop it.
Why does the checker show a key exchange group only for TLS 1.3?
In TLS 1.3 the group, like X25519 or X25519MLKEM768, is picked separately from the cipher suite, and the checker reads it from the handshake. For TLS 1.2 it shows the cipher suite, whose name already says the kind of key exchange, like ECDHE.